Publicité limitée de l'information et sur-réaction aux annonces lors des épisodes spéculatifs
The model of Morris and Shin  shows that imprecise public announcements can coordinate the actions of speculators far from the fundamental because of over-reaction to announcements. The strong focal potential of common knowledge is welfare damaging when it induces over-reaction to an imprecise public signal. However, laboratory experiments show that agents over-react to announcements, but not as much as what is theoretically predicted in models based on public information that generates common knowledge. This paper introduces the notion of limited degree of publicity, which seems to render better account for the actual degree of agents' over-reaction.
|Date of creation:||May 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Revue Economique, Presses de Sciences Po, 2006, 57 (3), pp.399-405|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00137477|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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