Simultaneous Gradient Learning in First-Price Auctions

We study equilibrium learning in discretized Bayesian games, focusing on first-price auctions as a testbed for gradient-based learning dynamics under private information. While the symmetric independent private values model admits a unique Bayesian correlated equilibrium (BCE) in the continuous limit, standard convergence guarantees for gradient-based learners do not apply: classical no-regret theory predicts convergence only to Bayesian coarse correlated equilibria (BCCE), which can remain large and far from the competitive equilibrium even under fine discretizations. To bridge this gap, we introduce the notion of Bayesian semicoarse correlated equilibrium (BSCCE), an equilibrium concept that refines BCCE by restricting deviations to probability-preserving transformations consistent with projected gradient dynamics. We provide a linear programming characterization of BSCCE with polynomially many variables and constraints and establish the inclusion hierarchy BCE ⊆ BSCCE ⊆ BCCE. Our main finding is that the BSCCE set contracts in many cases as the discretization of the Bayesian game is refined. Even with priors for which BCCE fails to concentrate, the diameter of the BSCCE polytope shrinks toward zero, indicating convergence to the unique continuous-game Bayes-Nash equilibrium. These results provide a principled explanation for the observed robustness of gradient-based learning in discretized Bayesian games, showing that these dynamics select a smaller equilibrium set than standard no-regret theory predicts.