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Promoting Cooperation in an Unequal World: Experimental evidence on the Role of Transparency and Punishment

Author

Listed:
  • Antoine Malezieux

    (BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - ESC Dijon-Bourgogne, CEREN - Centre de Recherche sur les Entreprises - BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - ESC Dijon-Bourgogne)

  • Jingnan Cecilia Chen

    (University of Exeter)

  • John d'Attoma
  • Miguel a Fonseca

    (University of Exeter)

Abstract

Across two studies, we examine the role of transparency and peer punishment in promoting cooperation and addressing economic inequality in public good contributions. With global inequality rising and the wealthiest few amassing a greater share of resources, its impact on social cohesion and business environments is increasingly significant. Financial secrecy further compounds these issues by allowing for income and wealth concealment at both societal and organizational levels. Our experimental findings reveal that transparency paired with peer punishment significantly boosts cooperation, particularly among advantaged individuals. In contrast, peer punishment alone proves insufficient to mitigate the adverse effects of inequality without the support of transparency. These results underscore the need for ethical governance structures that incorporate transparency, fairness, and accountability—principles essential for organizations committed to fostering trust and social responsibility in unequal settings.

Suggested Citation

  • Antoine Malezieux & Jingnan Cecilia Chen & John d'Attoma & Miguel a Fonseca, 2025. "Promoting Cooperation in an Unequal World: Experimental evidence on the Role of Transparency and Punishment," Post-Print hal-05798779, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05798779
    DOI: 10.1007/s10551-025-05998-8
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