IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-05796393.html

Atkinson–Shapley rules for TU-games: on the trade-off between efficiency and inequality

Author

Listed:
  • Walter Briec
  • Marc Dubois

    (UMay - Université de Mayotte (UMay), CHROME - Détection, évaluation, gestion des risques CHROniques et éMErgents (CHROME) - Nîmes Université - UNIMES - Nîmes Université)

  • Stéphane Mussard

    (CHROME - Détection, évaluation, gestion des risques CHROniques et éMErgents (CHROME) - Nîmes Université - UNIMES - Nîmes Université)

Abstract

This paper introduces a dominance criterion that determines whether a TU-game is less unequal than another. A game is derived from another by non-void sequences of inequality-reducing transfers of worth between coalitions of equal size if and only if the resulting game is less unequal in the Lorenz sense. The paper also measures payoff inequality among players (for a TU-game) through the Lorenz criterion. When a distribution (allocation) of payoff is issued from another by non-void sequences of inequality-reducing transfers of payoff between players, the resulting distribution of payoff is less unequal according to the Lorenz criterion (and conversely). It is shown that any linear-efficient-symmetric value, being invariant and separable under worth transfers and satisfying a fair treatment axiom, converts an inequality-reduction in TU-games into a decrease in payoff inequality among players.

Suggested Citation

  • Walter Briec & Marc Dubois & Stéphane Mussard, 2025. "Atkinson–Shapley rules for TU-games: on the trade-off between efficiency and inequality," Post-Print hal-05796393, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05796393
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-10019-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05796393. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.