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Lessons for the United States from Pharmaceutical Regulation Abroad

Author

Listed:
  • Margaret K Kyle

    (CEDP - Centre d'Economie et de Décision Publique (anciennement CERNA i3) - Mines Paris - PSL (École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris) - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - I3 - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

A American politicians from across the ideological spectrum have found a merican politicians from across the ideological spectrum have found a rare point of agreement: US drug prices are too high, and the government rare point of agreement: US drug prices are too high, and the government should do something about it. Figure 1 presents the results of a study of drug should do something about it. Figure 1 presents the results of a study of drug prices in different countries, which finds that overall US pharmaceutical prices, and prices in different countries, which finds that overall US pharmaceutical prices, and particularly prices of on-patent drugs, are several times higher than those in other particularly prices of on-patent drugs, are several times higher than those in other high-income countries such as France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom high-income countries such as France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom (Mulcahy, Schwam, and Lovejoy 2024). Such comparisons bolster the arguments of (Mulcahy, Schwam, and Lovejoy 2024). Such comparisons bolster the arguments of those advocating price controls or other government interventions in the United those advocating price controls or other government interventions in the United States. States.Why are policies around drug prices necessary? In other words, why do most developed countries rarely leave drug pricing to "the market" without government intervention? In all countries, pharmaceutical markets operate under conditions that differ substantially from the assumptions behind a competitive market that would equilibrate supply and demand based on price. These conditions reflect information problems, the specificities of healthcare markets, and the cost structure of drug development.First, pharmaceuticals are "credence goods": not only is their quality difficult for consumers to determine prior to consumption, but their effects are challenging to identify even after consumption. Regulation of entry, administered by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and similar regulators like the European Medicines Agency (EMA), aims to reduce this information asymmetry. Consumers can be Lessons for the United States from Pharmaceutical Regulation Abroad

Suggested Citation

  • Margaret K Kyle, 2025. "Lessons for the United States from Pharmaceutical Regulation Abroad," Post-Print hal-05419166, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05419166
    DOI: 10.1257/jep.20241418
    as

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    Cited by:

    1. Canta, Chiara & Madio, Leonardo & Mantovani, Andrea & Reggiani, Carlo, 2026. "Regulating Physicians’ Prices in the Presence of Health Platforms," TSE Working Papers 26-1741, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    2. Drake, Keith M. & McGuire, Thomas G., 2025. "Using stock price movements to estimate the harm from collusive drug patent litigation settlements," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
    3. Dubois, Pierre, 2025. "Pharmaceutical Regulation and Incentives for Innovation in an International Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 20728, Centre for Economic Policy Research.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L65 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology; Plastics
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy

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