Responsabilité sociale des entreprises et présence d’investisseurs étrangers dans un duopole mixte

This article studies how the presence of foreign investors in the capital of a private firm modifies the optimal level of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a mixed duopoly (public firm and private firm). The owners of the private firm have the possibility of offering their manager incentives in terms of social responsibility. The modes of competition in quantity (Cournot) and price (Bertrand) are analysed. We show that it is always in the private firm's interest to engage in CSR when competition between firms is less intense (Cournot). Conversely, in situations where competition is more intense (Bertrand), the private firm adopts a strategy of social irresponsibility (IrSE). Furthermore, the presence of foreign investors leads to a decline in the level of CSR when competition is less intense, whereas this presence makes it possible to limit irresponsible practices when competition is strong. Furthermore, compared with CSR, IrSE is a more profitable strategy for the private firm, but it leads to a decline in social well-being.