Taking the human factor into account in EDF's dam hazard studies[Prise en compte du "facteur humain" dans les études de dangers de barrages d'EDF]

Since the early days of the industrial era, human performance and human error have played a key role in industrial processes. The way people are trained, the way they work, the way they organize themselves and their working conditions have progressed just as much as the various technologies and the perception of human issues. The world of dams is no exception to these changes. In hazard studies (EDD for the French Etudes de Dangers), inappropriate human actions can constitute initiating events (EI for the French Evènement Initiateur) to the central dreaded event (ERC for the French Evènement Redouté Central). This may be the case, for example, of an untimely valve opening, leading to dangerous phenomena, or of valve non-openings contributing to the attainment of a vulnerability or danger rating. In first-generation SDEs, these initiating events were referred to as "human error", and the analysis focused on identifying possible errors that could have been committed by the responder. This reductionist approach focuses on the individual as the source of error, ignores social and organizational parameters, and overlooks the fact that, while human beings can make mistakes, they are also capable of overcoming situations in certain configurations. In second-generation ESDs, hazards involving the human factor are referred to as "Socio-Organizational and Human initiating event" (EI SOH). To rate the probability of occurrence of these initiating events, EDF has devised a specific method for dams. This method, known as "ECHO" (Evaluation et Cotation des dimensions Humaines et Organisationnelles) is conceptually inspired by James Reason's work on organizational accidents, and practically by Erik Hollnagel's CREAM method, which postulates that the failure of an action depends on the conditions under which it is carried out. This paper begins with an overview of the history of taking the human factor into account, followed by the genesis of the ECHO method and its main methodological principles (in particular, the 9 dimensions observed in the field and the approach used to propose a rating for SOH hazards). Lastly, future areas for improvement are discussed.