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Domestic effects of environnemental policies with transboundary pollution

Author

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  • Michel Cavagnac

    (LERNA - Economie des Ressources Naturelles - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - CEA - Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives, UNILIM - Université de Limoges)

  • Isabelle Péchoux

    (UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse)

Abstract

We model environmental interaction among countries as a policy game where governments in each country use quotas or taxes as strategy variables. The environmental policy has a triple role to play: targeting domestic emissions, providing strategic advantages for domestic firms and targeting imported pollution. Using a multi-sector economic model, we show that, besides the well-known inefficiencies arising at the international level, the environmental policy may lead to purely domestic inefficiencies.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Cavagnac & Isabelle Péchoux, 2010. "Domestic effects of environnemental policies with transboundary pollution," Post-Print hal-02653151, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02653151
    DOI: 10.3917/rel.761.0113
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael Hoel, 2005. "The Triple Inefficiency of Uncoordinated Environmental Policies," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 107(1), pages 157-173, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION; MULTISCTOR MODEL;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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