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Director compensation incentives and acquisition performance

Author

Listed:
  • Ismail Lahlou

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CREGO - Centre de Recherche en Gestion des Organisations (EA 7317) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UB - Université de Bourgogne - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE] - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

  • Patrick Navatte

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper investigates the relation between director compensation structure and shareholder interests in the context of acquisitions. Our evidence suggests that acquirer firms that compensate their directors with a higher proportion of incentive-based compensation have significantly higher stock returns around the announcement. Compared to acquirers in the low equity-based compensation group, acquirers in the high equity-based compensation group outperform by 9.54% in a five-day period surrounding the announcement date. These results hold even after controlling for endogeneity issues. We further find that acquirers with higher equity-based pay exhibit greater improvements in stock price and operating performance in the three years following acquisitions. An increase in director equity-based pay also results in a lower acquisition premium for targets. These results indicate that equity-based compensation provides incentives for directors to make decisions that meet the interests of shareholders.

Suggested Citation

  • Ismail Lahlou & Patrick Navatte, 2017. "Director compensation incentives and acquisition performance," Post-Print hal-01614572, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01614572
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2017.07.005
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    Cited by:

    1. Al-Faryan, Mamdouh Abdulaziz Saleh, 2021. "The Effect of Board Composition and Managerial Pay on Saudi Firm Performance," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, issue Online fi.
    2. Lai Van Vo & Huong Thi Thu Le & Youngbin Kim, 2023. "Board interlocks, career prospects and corporate social responsibility," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 63(4), pages 4565-4595, December.
    3. Mahroo Irani & Mahroo Irani & Mehdi Safari Gerayeli, 2017. "Relationship between Corporate Governance and CEO Compensation among Listed Firms in Tehran Stock Exchange," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 7(1), pages 285-292.
    4. Qingbang Mu & Wanxiao Zhang & Wenxiu Hu, 2023. "Enterprise Transformation and Innovation: A Study of Performance Compensation from the Perspective of Information Asymmetry," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(17), pages 1-23, August.
    5. Zhu, Zhengjie & Tian, Jia, 2024. "Minimum wage and corporate investment efficiency: Evidence from China," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    6. Tampakoudis, Ioannis & Noulas, Athanasios & Kiosses, Nikolaos, 2022. "The market reaction to syndicated loan announcements before and during the COVID-19 pandemic and the role of corporate governance," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    7. Zhao, Shifei & Liu, Jianwu & Jiang, Guizhong, 2024. "Executive education level heterogeneity and corporate internal pay gap," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 67(PA).
    8. Hu, Chun & He, Haoyang & Wang, Fei & SHIN, YEON-SOO, 2025. "Management equity incentives, market dynamics, and corporate R&D investment," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    9. Peng Xu & Guiyu Bai, 2019. "Board Governance, Sustainable Innovation Capability and Corporate Expansion: Empirical Data from Private Listed Companies in China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(13), pages 1-17, June.
    10. Hao Fang & Chieh-Hsuan Wang & Hwey-Yun Yau & Chien-Ping Chung & Yen-Hsien Lee, 2023. "The impact of board structure on bank loan herding via mediation of underperformance," Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(6), pages 1494-1517, November.
    11. Xu, Jing & Luo, Qianfang, 2025. "Controlling shareholder equity pledging, financing constraints, and corporate social responsibility," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    12. Wancheng Yang & Jinwen Xu & Yihan Zhang & Xiaodan Wei & Shaofeng Wang, 2023. "The incentive role of media companies’ executive compensation system in transformation and upgrading: Evidence from listed media companies in China," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 18(6), pages 1-19, June.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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