IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Are judges harsher with repeated offenders? Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights


  • Eric Langlais

    () (EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Alessandro Melcarne

    () (EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Giovanni Battista Ramello


This work takes profit from a peculiar aspect of International adjudication, namely the award of monetary compensation to victims of breach of International commitments. In particular, the present analysis focuses on the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the mechanism behind the award of monetary redress in terms of just satisfaction to individual victims injured by the breach of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Based on the empirical analysis conducted on an innovative dataset concerning states' performance before the ECtHR, the present paper argues that awarding just satisfaction tends to move away from mere compensation of injured victims toward a more complex system. Following the ideal goal of inducing effective compliance with the ECHR, and reasonably struggling for the internalization of the externalities due to the breach, judges tend to reprimand respondent states for their recalcitrant behaviour, being not able to detect ex-ante the optimal level of deterrence by inflicting increasing fines. This would suggest that the Court adjusts its behaviour according to the performance of a member state in terms of respect of the law.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Langlais & Alessandro Melcarne & Giovanni Battista Ramello, 2017. "Are judges harsher with repeated offenders? Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights," Post-Print hal-01549905, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01549905
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server:

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    More about this item


    [No keyword available];


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01549905. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.