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Commons as insurance: theoretical predictions and an experimental test

Author

Listed:
  • Marielle Brunette

    (LEF - Laboratoire d'Economie Forestière - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - AgroParisTech)

  • Philippe Delacote

    (LEF - Laboratoire d'Economie Forestière - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - AgroParisTech)

  • Serge S. Garcia

    (LEF - Laboratoire d'Economie Forestière - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - AgroParisTech)

  • Jean-Marc Rousselle

    (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier)

Abstract

In this paper, we deal with the impact of the safety-net use of Common Pool Resource (CPR) on the individual investment into and extraction from the commons. We propose a theoretical model with two steps: agents of the community choose to invest in their private project and in the commons; second, they choose how much to extract from their private project and the commons. The model compares two types of risk-management tool: CPR as risk coping and risk diversification mechanisms. It also compares two types of risk: risk on a private project and risk on CPR investment by other community members. In a second part of the paper, we test empirically the theoretical results through experimental economics. Such a test needs to propose a new CPR game composed of two periods, an investment one and an extraction one. We propose such an original game inspired from the two existing CPR games, Investment game (Olstrom et al., 1994) and Request game (Budescu et al., 1992).

Suggested Citation

  • Marielle Brunette & Philippe Delacote & Serge S. Garcia & Jean-Marc Rousselle, 2012. "Commons as insurance: theoretical predictions and an experimental test," Post-Print hal-01003283, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01003283
    as

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