Droits de propriété intellectuelle et théorie des facilités essentielles : les divergences transatlantiques en matière de politiques de concurrence
While the US Supreme Court, since its decision in Trinko, tends to jettison the Essential Facilities Doctrine, in the European Union the doctrine is not only enforced but even extended to intangible assets. Such a divergence could lie in two different conceptions of competition dynamics prevailing on either sides of the Atlantic, especially with regard to the importance of market structures and the question of incentives to innovate. As an illustration of two competition policies seeking for two different types of economic efficiency, the Microsoft case is of particular interest. This article sets out the grounds of the US and EU antitrust authorities' decisions in regard to refusal to deal cases.
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|Date of creation:||01 Apr 2010|
|Publication status:||Published in Revue d Economie Industrielle -Paris- Editions Techniques et Economiques-, Publiee Avec le Concours du C.N.R.S., 2010, 129-130, pp.277-300|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00634315|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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