A Typical Case of Weak Institutional Complementarity in Institution Building : The Design of Transmission Network Monopoly in Competitive Electricity Markets

In a "Weak institutional complementarity" type of institution building it is typically the less replaceable institutional characteristic which dictates the path of change for the institution as a whole. We will show it is exactly what explains the diversity and imperfection of actual transmission monopoly designs in competitive electricity markets. Firstly we argue that transmission monopoly in competitive electricity markets has to be analysed within an industry modular frame. Transmission is a set of several modules which have to be distinguished and separated in any design analysis and comparison. At least three modules make the core of transmission design: 1° the short run management of network externality; 2° the short run management of cross border trade; and 3° the long run management of network investment. Second in a new-institutional economics perspective we say that 1°monopoly design in a competitive policy cannot handle these three modules irrespective of the "institutional" definition and allocation of property rights on transmission; while 2°definition and allocation of property rights on transmission cannot ignore the existing electrical industry and transmission network structure: they basically have to complement each other. Third we apply this frame to compare PJM (USA) and NGC (UK) and we show it remarkably illuminates the reality.