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Renégocier pour durer, une analyse empirique des contrats de concessions

Author

Listed:
  • Jean Beuve

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, IAE Paris - Sorbonne Business School)

  • Julie De Brux

    (IAE Paris - Sorbonne Business School)

  • Stéphane Saussier

    (IAE Paris - Sorbonne Business School, GREGOR - Groupe de Recherche en Gestion des Organisations - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - IAE Paris - Sorbonne Business School)

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of renegotiations on contractual relationship. Using an original data set of expired public-private contracts in the French car park sector, we investigate the link between renegotiations and contract renewals. Indeed, if renegotiations led to surplus decrease, then parties would not be prone to contract again together. Our econometric results reveal that some renegotiation types, their frequency, and their scope clearly impact the probability to see a contract renewed as soon as public authorities have discretionary power on the decision to renew a contract with the same private partner. Hence, our results suggest a positive, negative, or neutral impact on the contractual surplus depending on the kind of renegotiation and the kind of contract that is considered.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean Beuve & Julie De Brux & Stéphane Saussier, 2013. "Renégocier pour durer, une analyse empirique des contrats de concessions," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01070808, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01070808
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    Cited by:

    1. Elhadji Mounirou Ndiaye, 2018. "Public/Private Partnership and tariff regulation failure: the example of Dakar/Diamniadio toll highway in Senegal," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(1), pages 393-403.

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