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The timing of elections in federations: A discipline device against Soft Budget Constraint?

Author

Listed:
  • Emmanuelle Taugourdeau

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Karolina Kaiser

    (LMU - Ludwig Maximilian University [Munich] = Ludwig Maximilians Universität München)

Abstract

We introduce political economics into the soft budget constraint problem by asking if the timing of elections has the potential to harden budget constraints. Specifically, we ask under which circumstances the soft budget constraint problem is worse--with synchronized elections, i.e. simultaneous central and regional office terms, or with staggered elections, i.e. terms of office that do not coincide. We find that staggered elections clearly improve fiscal discipline at the local level as well as welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Emmanuelle Taugourdeau & Karolina Kaiser, 2013. "The timing of elections in federations: A discipline device against Soft Budget Constraint?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00652261, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00652261
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9814-y
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    Cited by:

    1. Diego Martínez‐López, 2022. "Subnational borrowing and bailouts: When the federal government looks at the votes (differently) and its borrowing matters," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(3), pages 609-633, June.
    2. Ross Hickey, 2015. "Intergovernmental transfers and re-election concerned politicians," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 331-351, November.

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