Closed Season e Seguro-Defeso: Análise de Incentivos e Avaliação de Impacto

Paying fishermen not to work can preserve endangered aquatic species? Or is enough just ban fishing? In Brazil, the government carries both two policies, seeking to preserve vulnerable species. Although there are more than 200 fishery prohibition regulation and around $ 18 billion of reais have been spent between 2002 and 2017 with payment of "seguro-defeso", there is no paper in the literature that evaluates the impact of this policy. Aiming to fill this gap and bring additional light to the debate on the effectiveness of state intervention in the economy and the environment, this paper analyzes the incentives on fishermans'decisions and evaluates the impact of closed season policy and the payment of benefits. The theoretic analysis finds incentives to reduce fishing in the closed season, resulting from the prohibition with monitoring and sanction. Theoretically, the additional monetary benefit reinforces that effect. Finally, that policy also encourages the fisherman to work in another activity during the ban. The impact evaluation estimates a 43% reduction in fishing during the ban. By improving the reproduction of the species, the production of fishing has a three-fold increase in the fishing-allowed period. As for the benefit, an increase of 1% has a small effect of 4% in the reduction of fishing. In addition, there is evidence that a 1% increase in the amount of benefit directed to the artisanal fisherman increases industrial production of about 3%. This result may suggest that the fisherman is working in another activity during the ban.