Author
Listed:
- Débora Costa Ferreira
- Fernando B. Meneguin
- Maurício Soares Bugarin
Abstract
While ministers of Brazilian Supreme Court have been sympathetic to US theories suggesting broad benefits for expanding the competencies of subnational entities, empirical studies show legislative assemblies to be inefficient in producing laws that carry positive impact to society. In that context, this paper analyzes the incentives' structure that influences the state or district deputies at the moment of proposing bills, by means of an economic model, which leads to the conclusion that the current institutional design of states' institutions has generated incentives for these agents to produce particularistic, irrelevant and/or unconstitutional laws. From the analysis, it is concluded that there is no effectiveness in expanding the constitutional attributions of state deputies if they do not have the technical competence in the elaboration of laws and public policies that improve the welfare of society as a whole or to carry out inspection activities and if control of constitutionality of state laws is not effective. If these conditions are present and as long as this list of constitutional powers of the deputies is not sufficiently expanded, the supervisory function is the alternative that maximizes social welfare.
Suggested Citation
Débora Costa Ferreira & Fernando B. Meneguin & Maurício Soares Bugarin, 2018.
"Atuação do poder legislativo estadual: análise dos incentivos dos deputados estaduais na atividade legislativa,"
Economics and Politics Working Paper Series
84/2018, Economics and Politics Research Group (EPRG), University of Brasília.
Handle:
RePEc:gvn:eprgwp:842018
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23594691
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