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Eficiência, atratividade e dissuasão de acordos de leniência e combate à corrupção: o caso da Operação Lava-Jato

Author

Listed:
  • Rafael M. Gomes
  • Roberto Aragão Neto
  • Maurício Soares Bugarin
  • André L. Gama

Abstract

This paper uses game theory to build additional tools for those who work with leniency policy on calculating sanctions imposed to lenient firms from cartels involved in public biddings, under Brazilian legislation. The main characteristic of this analysis is modelling the State as a player who not only designs the mechanism of the leniency program but is also the most affected by the cartel, and is especially interested at imposing due sanctions. Thus, we show how to harmonize the attractiveness of leniency and its advantage to the State keeping the focus on the deterrence effect. We find that, under certain conditions, leniency policies stop being an impunity factor and become a useful tool for fighting corruption. However, the paper shows that the formula to calculate fines currently adopted by the State makes it harder to meet these conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Rafael M. Gomes & Roberto Aragão Neto & Maurício Soares Bugarin & André L. Gama, 2018. "Eficiência, atratividade e dissuasão de acordos de leniência e combate à corrupção: o caso da Operação Lava-Jato," Economics and Politics Working Paper Series 83/2018, Economics and Politics Research Group (EPRG), University of Brasília.
    • Handle: RePEc:gvn:eprgwp:832018
    DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23594676
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