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Motivação Partidária nas Transferências Voluntárias da União: O papel do Legislativo Federal

Author

Listed:
  • Fernanda L. Marciniuk
  • Maurício Soares Bugarin
  • Débora Costa Ferreira

Abstract

This paper presents empirical evidence that the distribution of federal voluntary transfers is biased in favor of municipalities in which the mayor's party has higher identification with the coalition of parties in the Legislature that has strong representation in the municipality. This research measures party identification between the federal Legislature and the municipal Executive branch based on Bendavid -Val's locational quotients applied to voting data . The paper's main contribution is to go beyond the mayor-president partisan transfers' approach, and to shed light on the important role the federal Legislature plays in the partisan distribution of subnational voluntary transfers.

Suggested Citation

  • Fernanda L. Marciniuk & Maurício Soares Bugarin & Débora Costa Ferreira, 2020. "Motivação Partidária nas Transferências Voluntárias da União: O papel do Legislativo Federal," Economics and Politics Working Paper Series 101/2020, Economics and Politics Research Group (EPRG), University of Brasília.
    • Handle: RePEc:gvn:eprgwp:1012020
    DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23574351
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    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models

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