Liability Law and the Control of Externalities with Costly and Uncertain Litigation
Is liability law a suitable instrument for controlling externalities? The optimistic view from the law and economics literature conflicts with observed outcomes from jurisdictions relying on a tort-based procedure for controlling externalities. This discrepancy can be attributed to the fact that results from the highly simplified models used by earlier writers are not robust to modest improvements in the realism of the model structures.
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|Date of creation:||1998|
|Date of revision:|
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