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Adjusted Winner Under Restricted Divisibility

Author

Listed:
  • Steven J. Brams

    (New York University, USA)

  • D. Marc Kilgour

    (Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada)

  • Christian Klamler

    (University of Graz, Austria)

Abstract

We study two-person fair division when multiple items are indivisible and exactly one item, interpreted as money, is divisible. This setting imposes a natural restriction relative to the classical Adjusted Winner (AW) procedure, in which any item may become the split item. We introduce Adjusted Winner with Money (AWm), an ordered-allocation procedure tailored to this mixed environment. We identify a sufficient condition, Condition C, under which AWm produces an allocation that is both envy-free and equitable without splitting any indivisible item. When Condition C fails, AWm need not achieve full envy-freeness, but it still guarantees envy-freeness for mixed items. We also clarify the relation between AWm and Pareto-optimality. When classical AWwould split the money item, AWm coincides with AW; more generally, however, AWm need not be Pareto-optimal among all allocations that divide only money. Simulations based on Dirichletdistributed valuations indicate that Condition C is frequently satisfied, especially when the divisible item is relatively valuable. To illustrate the procedure, we apply it to the division of property in a real-life divorce case.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour & Christian Klamler, 2026. "Adjusted Winner Under Restricted Divisibility," Graz Economics Papers 2026-05, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:grz:wpaper:2026-05
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    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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