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On the Role of International Courts

Author

Listed:
  • Jasmina Karabegovic

    (University of Graz, Austria)

  • Christoph Kuzmics

    (University of Graz, Austria)

Abstract

International cooperation sometimes requires flexible agreements that permit temporary non-compliance in certain circumstances. Whether these circumstances occur is often only privately known by the non-complying partner. This paper analyzes how an international court that can only provide information without having any enforcement power can help sustain such flexible international agreements. We study this in a repeated game setting where the monitoring is public but imperfect. We find that for sufficiently patient governments there are in principle highly efficient self-enforcing agreements available. We then focus on the case of impatient governments and identify conditions under which an international court without enforcement power could indeed improve the efficiency of agreements.

Suggested Citation

  • Jasmina Karabegovic & Christoph Kuzmics, 2025. "On the Role of International Courts," Graz Economics Papers 2025-04, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:grz:wpaper:2025-04
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Repeated games; imperfect public monitoring; international trade; dispute resolution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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