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Offres publiques d’achat : dissuasion ou prix minimal, offre hostile ou négociée

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  • Aussilloux, Vincent
  • Bessière, Véronique

Abstract

[fre] Offres publiques d'achat. Dissuasion ou prix minimal, offre hostile ou négociée. . Les offres publiques sont modélisées comme un jeu d'enchère dans lequel est intégrée la possibilité de négocier directement avec la cible. Deux types d'acquéreurs sont distingués, en fonction des synergies élevées ou faibles. Le modèle montre que l'acquéreur à fortes synergies a intérêt à lancer une offre amicale qui lui permet d'obtenir à un meilleur prix la société visée. Ce n'est qu'en cas d'échec des négociations qu'il entreprend une offre hostile pour laquelle la stratégie dissuasive qui décourage toute surenchère est plus profitable que l'offre à prix mini­mal qui génère simplement l'accord des actionnaires. L'acquéreur à faibles synergies ne peut payer le prix dissuasif et, selon les cas, engage une négociation ou une offre hostile à prix minimal. [eng] Takeover bids : hostile or friendly offer, dissuasive or minimum price. . Takeovers are studied as a kind of auction process, where bidder and target can negotiate aside. The model provides a general analysis of takeover price. It explores (1) the hostile strategy as a decision between a dissuasive or minimum price and (2), the choice between a hostile or negotiated offer. Two types of acquirers are considered, according to the level of synergies. The model predicts that the high-type bidder prefers a friendly offer. If negotiation fails, the hostile offer is undertaken and the high-type bidder proposes the preemptive price. The low-type bidder cannot pay the dissuasive price and he undertakes a hostile minimum bid or a friendly offer, according to differences in parameters.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Aussilloux, Vincent & Bessière, Véronique, 1998. "Offres publiques d’achat : dissuasion ou prix minimal, offre hostile ou négociée," Accepted Papers Series 1998-1, Montpellier University, Center for Research in Finance.
  • Handle: RePEc:grf:mtpaps:ab001
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