Author
Abstract
The paper fails to make a convincing case for mutualisation instead of public ownership of water companies in England and Wales. • It shows no awareness that when the same issue arose with the railway network 25 years ago, the Blair government tried creating Network Rail as a private not-for-profit ‘mutual’, which was later taken into public ownership because it did not deliver public control or economic efficiency. • Internationally, water co-ops are marginal, used in some countries for thinly populated rural areas. The largest water co-op in the world serves less than 1m. people, in the Bolivian city of Santa Cruz. • It mistakenly claims that Welsh Water and John Lewis are consumer mutuals, and fails to discuss the known governance problems of mutuals • The GGF paper misrepresents its own polling results as supporting mutuals as the only option, whereas almost all groups except Reform voters preferred public ownership. • It repeatedly assumes that public ownership would require compensation to the private owners, but somehow the shareholders would not demand compensation for mutualisation. • It argues that mutualisation can provide public control, but insists that control by elected councillors must be kept to a minority • It wrongly implies that public ownership would mean that costs would have to be covered out of taxes, whereas they would continue to be covered entirely by customer bills, as now. • The proposals are driven by a UK rule about the debt of public companies which treats it as government debt, and so a new operator must remain private. But this rule is not used by EU countries and the USA, which have significantly lower borrowing costs than the UK. • It makes proposals for ‘voluntary’ mutualisation, which could lead to company profits being used to pay shareholders instead of invested in water and sewer age systems. • It contains some useful suggestions, for example setting rules for the levels of breaches of duty which would lead to a company being taken into public ownership – yet if applied, it would lead to the automatic Special Administration of Welsh Water – which the GGF use as a model for their proposed mutuals.
Suggested Citation
Hall, David, 2026.
"Why the GGF paper proposing mutuals for water is wrong,"
Greenwich Papers in Political Economy
54326, University of Greenwich, Greenwich Political Economy Research Centre.
Handle:
RePEc:gpe:wpaper:54326
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