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Innovationen im Kontext von Nachhaltigkeit


  • Lukas Krüger
  • Kilian Bizer


Innovationen sind das Kernelement des Überlebens und der Positionierung von Volkswirtschaften, da sie zur Befriedigung der Marktbedürfnisse beitragen. Vor dem Hintergrund knapper Ressourcen werden jedoch regelmäßig nur die Innovationen realisiert, die aus einer betriebswirtschaftlichen Betrachtung vorteilhaft erscheinen und damit weniger als eigentlich sinnvoll wären. Zunehmend setzt sich allerdings die Erkenntnis durch, dass die betriebswirtschaftliche Marktabgrenzung und damit die traditionelle Wirtschaftlichkeitsbewertung von Innovationen und Innovationsprojekten zu eng sind. Vielmehr erfordert die heutige Innovationsbewertung eine Erweiterung um soziale und ökologische Aspekt, also eine nachhaltige Ausrichtung. Basierend auf dem Forschungsprojekt „Nachhaltigkeitsorientierte Bewertung von Innovationsprojekten (NaBI)“ gibt dieses Papier einen Überblick über das Forschungsfeld und analysiert die Nachhaltigkeitstheorie im Hinblick auf Innovationen. Im Ergebnis wird die Festlegung auf ein bestimmtes Indikatorset für die jeweilige Nachhaltigkeitsebene (Satellitensystem) vorgeschlagen, in denen essenzielle Bestandteile mit festgelegten Grenzwerten vorgegeben sind.

Suggested Citation

  • Lukas Krüger & Kilian Bizer, 2009. "Innovationen im Kontext von Nachhaltigkeit," Departmental Discussion Papers 144, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:got:vwldps:144

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    More about this item


    Nachhaltigkeit; Innovation; Innovationsbewertung;

    JEL classification:

    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm


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