Author
Listed:
- Marisol Rodríguez Chatruc
(Inter-American Development Bank, Montevideo, Uruguay)
- Ernesto Stein
(School of Government and Public Transformation, Tecnológico de Monterrey)
- Razvan Vlaicu
(Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C., United States of America)
- Zuluaga, Victor
(Banco de México, Mexico City, Mexico)
Abstract
International trade increases aggregate welfare but also creates winners and losers, making it politically contentious. Recent research has established that individuals are more sensitive to anti-trade information about the prospect of employment loss than to pro-trade information about lower prices or greater variety. In this paper, we study how individual attitudes and beliefs change in response to information about employment losses (in import-competing sectors), gains (in export-oriented sectors), and the possibility of compensation for displaced workers. To this end, we conducted a large-scale survey experiment in 18 Latin American countries using nationally representative samples. We find that anti-trade information reduces support for trade even whencompensation is mentioned, while pro-trade messages increase support only when they emphasize job gains. Belief updating about trade’s employment effects seems to be a relevant mechanism. Our findings have important implications on what types of messaging work to increase support for trade: Although compensation is often recommended to build support for trade liberalizations, it can backfire in practice. At the same time, emphasizing employment creation in export sectors offers a more effective strategy to bolster public support for trade policies.
Suggested Citation
Marisol Rodríguez Chatruc & Ernesto Stein & Razvan Vlaicu & Zuluaga, Victor, 2026.
"How Employment Framing Affects Trade Preferences: Evidence from Survey Experiments,"
Working Paper Series of the School of Government and Public Transformation
21, School of Government and Public Transformation, Tecnológico de Monterrey.
Handle:
RePEc:gnt:wpaper:21
Download full text from publisher
More about this item
Keywords
;
;
;
;
;
JEL classification:
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Statistics
Access and download statistics
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gnt:wpaper:21. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Fabian Fuentes-Rivas (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/egtecmx.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through
the various RePEc services.