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The Dynamics of Property Rights in Modern Autocracies

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Abstract

This paper studies a dynamic model of property ownership and appropriation in modern autocracies. An autocrat represents the interests of an elite ``in-group." It chooses whether and how much to appropriate from public assets and from private assets of an ``out-group" at each date. To maintain the appearance of the rule of law, the autocrat implements an ownership assignment only if it is accepted by the affected citizens. However, because its enforcement of property rights is tied to the duration of its commitment, the autocrat's enforcement is conditional and temporary. Consequently, the autocrat systematically appropriates property from the out-group and from public assets. Under some initial conditions, the autocrat initially implements popular land reform only reverse course later on. More generally, wealth shares of both public property and private property of the out-group decline monotonically after an initial adjustment period. The model rationalizes the connection between increasing wealth inequality and privatization in autocracies such as Russia and China. Simulations of these countries' wealth distributions to mid 21st century display widening gaps in wealth between elites and the rest of the populace. Finally, we show that the ruling group under anocracy, an autocratic system that admits civil society groups, will generally be better off than under a traditional autocracy. The dilemma is that the anocratic system might enable the growth of an opposition party that eventually displaces the ruling group. Classification-C73, D72, H13, H41, P5

Suggested Citation

  • Dan Cao & Roger Lagunoff, 2021. "The Dynamics of Property Rights in Modern Autocracies," Working Papers gueconwpa~21-21-12, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~21-21-12
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    Keywords

    Authoritarian legalism; autocracy; anocracy; property rights; appropriation constraint; takings; civil society groups; Samuelson condition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P36 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Consumer Economics; Health; Education and Training; Welfare, Income, Wealth, and Poverty

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