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Réglementation vs taxe-subvention vs permis négociables. Quelle efficacité des instruments de régulation pour la réduction des émissions azotées dans le bassin rhénan ?

Author

Listed:
  • Saulnier, J.

Abstract

La régulation par une approche réglementaire mise en œuvre dans le bassin rhénan n'a pas apporté tous les résultats escomptés en matière de réduction des émissions azotées. En outre, il s'agit d'une approche dont la théorie économique nous enseigne qu'elle peut être relativement couteuse. Dans cet article, nous nous interrogeons donc sur le fait de savoir si les instruments économiques que sont la taxe-subvention et les permis négociables pourraient offrir une alternative. La réponse à cette question nécessite de procéder à l'évaluation des gains d'efficacité que chaque instrument permet. A bénéfice identique, c'est en effet le gain en terme de réduction des coûts d'épuration comparé au coût additionnel d'adaptation pour le régulateur qui peut nous éclairer sur l'opportunité du recours à un instrument préférablement à un autre. Les simulations réalisées indiquent que l'efficacité des instruments économiques est significativement réduite par rapport à une situation théorique de moindre coût qui permettrait des gains en terme de coût de réduction des émissions de l'ordre de 40% par rapport à la poursuite d'une approche principalement réglementaire. En comparaison, les permis conduisent à un gain de 28% et un système de taxe-subvention généralisé légèrement inférieur. La taxe subvention étant déjà présente dans le contexte européen, cela nous amène plutôt à envisager cette solution comme celle qui devrait être favorisée dans le futur.

Suggested Citation

  • Saulnier, J., 2008. "Réglementation vs taxe-subvention vs permis négociables. Quelle efficacité des instruments de régulation pour la réduction des émissions azotées dans le bassin rhénan ?," Working Papers 200808, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
  • Handle: RePEc:gbl:wpaper:200808
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    EFFICACITE; INSTRUMENT ECONOMIQUE; REGLEMENTATION; OPTIMISATION; EXTERNALITE; EMISSION AZOTEE; BASSIN RHENAN;

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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