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Does a Window of Opportunity Swing Open for the Knaves When the Lords Have a Skirmish?

Author

Listed:
  • Timofey Ginker

    (Department of Economics Bar-Ilan University, Israel)

  • Konstantin Yanovsky

    (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy)

  • Sergey Zhavoronkov

    (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy)

Abstract

Notes on the Endogenous Generation of Political Competition. An attempt at a formalized description of the formation process of constitutionally limited Government when a balance of forces is preserved among the “bandits” (strongmen) competing for power. Magna Carta treaty as institution, causing (strengthening) incentive among free armed individuals to prevent strongest bandit from the treaty conditions breach and individual rights' violation, considered as a pattern of necessary preconditions' creation for system of Limited Government. The Model developed in the paper could explain some cases of endogenous arising of politically competitive system of government and Government restricting constitutional agreements. Few cases analysis – both historical and currently observed (Eastern Europe, Middle East) is provided for illustration of the Model. The implications for the attempts to establish or to support the new democracies in the countries with long lasted tradition of Bandits’ rule proposed.

Suggested Citation

  • Timofey Ginker & Konstantin Yanovsky & Sergey Zhavoronkov, 2014. "Does a Window of Opportunity Swing Open for the Knaves When the Lords Have a Skirmish?," Working Papers 0105, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2014.
  • Handle: RePEc:gai:wpaper:0105
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    File URL: https://www.iep.ru/files/RePEc/gai/wpaper/0105Yanovsky.pdf
    File Function: Revised version, 2014
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Limited government; Bandit competition; stalemate; Foreign Player;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • N10 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - General, International, or Comparative

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