The Economic Consequences of a Declining Hegemon
This paper is an attempt to review the concepts of "international public goods" and "hegemony" from the stand point of an economist. It focuses on the incentive structure that a large country or hegemon as well as other countries face in order to make a collective decision. It is misleading, I will argue, to treat many different situations in a single framework of "public goods" or "hegemony". The benefit-cost structure for nations in the trade liberalization process or trade conflicts is different from that in the international monetary cooperation or in the choice of the international monetary regime.
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|Date of creation:||1996|
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