Powerful Wives and Faithful Husbands
This paper studies the influence of social norms to a marriage bargaining process, when there is the private information on each player's side. We add hidden information on the player's characteristic or type to a marriage bargaining model where social norms determines the sharing rule for the gains from marriage. Then, unless one has a very high stand alone budget at his/her diposal, only unions between two high type persons can rach utility improvement for both.
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|Date of creation:||1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST-LOUIS, SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND CENTER IN POLITICAL ECONOMY, ST-LOUIS MISSOURI 63130 U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.olin.wustl.edu/
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