The Organization of Financial Exchange Markets: Theory and Evidence
This article presents theory and evidence regarding the organization of financial exchange markets. It derives conditions under which (1) a member-owned exchange has a monpoly over the trade of a particular financial contract and its close substitutes, and (2) exchange members earn economic rents.
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|Date of creation:||1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University. Campus Box 1133, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis MO 63130-4899.|
Web page: http://www.olin.wustl.edu/ble/
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