The Self-Regulation of Private Organised Markets
In a Walres-debreu world, all relevant attributes of all traded commodities are completely and costlessly specified, information is symmetric and costless, and all contracts ate costlessly enforced. In the real world in which trade takes place, it is costly to specify and verify commodity attributes, profound information asymmetries can exist, and parties have an incentive to renege opportunistically on their contractual commitments.
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