Scientific Information and Products Liability: An Economic Analysis
This paper demonstrates that the utilization of information that is available ex-post but unavailable ex-ante may lead to adverse incentive effects in the design of new products, i.e., in installing safety devices in products, in developing technologies that reduce the distribution of risks involved in the use of products and in investing in research that can identify the risks in advance.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1996|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://econ.tau.ac.il/research/foerder.aspEmail:
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:30-96. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.