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Wage Setting In Sweden: An Empirical Test Of Barebones Union Model




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  • Forslund, A., 1990. "Wage Setting In Sweden: An Empirical Test Of Barebones Union Model," Papers 463, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:stocin:463

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Martin L. Weitzman, 1989. "A Theory of Wage Dispersion and Job Market Segmentation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(1), pages 121-137.
    2. Barry McCormick, 1990. "A Theory of Signalling During Job Search, Employment Efficiency, and "Stigmatised" Jobs," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 299-313.
    3. Gottfries, Nils & McCormick, Barry, 1995. "Discrimination and open unemployment in a segmented labour market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 1-15, January.
    4. Kevin M. Murphy & Robert H. Topel, 1987. "The Evolution of Unemployment in the United States: 1968 -- 1985," NBER Chapters,in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1987, Volume 2, pages 11-68 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Albert Ma, Ching-to & Weiss, Andrew M., 1993. "A signaling theory of unemployment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 135-157, January.
    6. Lawrence H. Summers, 1986. "Why is the Unemployment Rate So Very High near Full Employment," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 17(2), pages 339-396.
    7. Grout, Paul A, 1984. "Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargining Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 449-460, March.
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