IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Seigneuriage et financement d'un bien public

  • Crettez, B.
  • Michel, P.
  • Wigniolle, B.

Dans ce document, on itudie le seigneuriage dans un modhle ` ginirations imbriquies avec contrainte de liquiditi. La monnaie criie par le gouvernement sert ` financer un bien public. On considhre d'abord le cas oy c'est le seul instrument de financement, le bien public correspondant ` un seigneuriage pur. Le montant de bien public est alors igal ` la valeur rielle prilevie par le gouvernement ` l'aide de la criation monitaire. Nous mettons en ividence une "courbe de Laffer" du seigneuriage, ou, a partir d'un certain niveau de creation monetaire, la valeur de la monnaie creee diminue et tend vers zero. L'optimum social dynamique depend fondamentalement du choix du facteur d'actualisation social. C'est un optimum de second rang, obtenu sous forme explicite. L'introduction d'instruments de politique economique supplementaires, les transferts forfaitaires, permet de realiser l'optimum social de premier rang, ou les distorsions monetaires sont totalement neutralisees. Pour cela, il faut que le rendement reel de la monnaie soit egal au rendement des investissements dans les firmes. C'est la regle de Friedman dont la realisation impose que le gouvernement detruise de la monnaie en sorte que le taux de deflation soit egal au taux d'interet.

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Paper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) in its series Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications with number 98.40.

in new window

Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:pariem:98.40
Contact details of provider: Postal:
France; Universite de Paris I - Pantheon- Sorbonne, 12 Place de Pantheon-75005 Paris, France

Phone: + 33 44 07 81 00
Fax: + 33 1 44 07 83 01
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:pariem:98.40. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.