Coalition-Proof Implementation of Competitive Equilibria on a Constrained Reinsurance Market
We derive from Bernis  a strategic mechanism which fully implements the set of competitive equilibria on a dynamically incomplete reinsurance market VIA Nash equilibria. The mechanism is feasible, and such that the set of coalition proof Nash equilibria coincides with that of Nash equilibria. We thus provide a general framework for the design of decentralized mechanisms on the reinsurance market whose outcomes are efficient even when collusion among insurers is allowed.
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|Date of creation:||2000|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: France; Universite de Paris I - Pantheon- Sorbonne, 12 Place de Pantheon-75005 Paris, France|
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