Who Buys and Who Sells Options: The Role and Pricing of Options in an Economy with Background Risk
In this paper, we derive an equilibrium in which some investors buy call/put options on the market portfolio while others sell them. Since investors are assumed to have similar risk-averse preferences, the demand for these contracts is not explained by differences in the shape of utility functions. Rather, it is the degree to which agents face other, non-hedgeable, background risks that determines their risk-taking behavior in the model. We show that investors with low or no background risk have a concave sharing rule, i.e., they sell options on the market portfolio, whereas investors with high background risk have a convex sharing rule and buy these options.
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|Date of creation:||Feb 1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: U.S.A.; New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics . 44 West 4th Street. New York, New York 10012-1126|
Phone: (212) 998-0100
Web page: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/finance/
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