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EU Membership for Central Europe : Commitments, Speed and Conditionality

Author

Listed:
  • de Crombrugghe, A
  • Minton-Beddoes, Z
  • Sachs, J-D

Abstract

This paper givers a motivation and a mothod for a fast intergration of the reforming countries of central Europe into the European union. The motivation is based on a model of self-fulfilling prophecies where the expectation of entry can trigger the coordination of expectations towards a fast-growth, catch-up equilibrium, and help central Europe avoid the stagnation equilibrium. The method is a set of conditions and a target date which ensure that the new members will not destabilize the Union but contribute to its development.

Suggested Citation

  • de Crombrugghe, A & Minton-Beddoes, Z & Sachs, J-D, 1996. "EU Membership for Central Europe : Commitments, Speed and Conditionality," Papers 29, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:nodapa:29
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. repec:kap:iaecre:v:5:y:1999:i:1:p:16-23 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Erzsébet Kovács & Zoltán Kollár, 1999. "The choice of dilemmas in Hungary's transition: Westernization or latin americanization?," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 5(1), pages 16-23, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM; EUROPE; ECONOMIC INTEGRATION; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; ECONOMIC MODELS; EXPECTATIONS; SPECULATION;

    JEL classification:

    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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