Fiscal Policy Coordination in the Transition Towards the EMU
The paper studies stabilization-coordination in Europe. Conventional models (welfare analysis and game-theoretical approach) are used to show that fiscal policy coordination may improve the welfare of countries in a symmetrical framework (identical preference).
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|Date of creation:||1996|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: FACULTE UNIVERSITAIRE NOTRE-DAME DE LA PAIX, FACULTE DES SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES ET SOCIALES, RUE DE BRUXELLES NAMUR FRANCE.|
Web page: http://www.fundp.ac.be/facultes/eco/
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