Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and Entry
Firms regularly introduce new, non-patentable products and innovations. When the possibility of a new product or an innovation arises to a potential seller, the seller faces a risk in successfully creating and producing a new product that consumers value above its costs. This framework enables a new analysis of signaling and adverse selection in models of fixed, exogenous quality or types.
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|Date of creation:||1994|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, EAST LANSING MICHIGAN 48824 U.S.A.|
Web page: http://econ.msu.edu/
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