Corruption: Top Down or Bottom Up?
We study the degree of corruption in a hierarchical model of government. In particular, we explore the question of whether adding a layer of government simply increases the total amount of corruption or generates an organizational efficiency (via a principal-agent relationship between levels of government) that reduces the total amount of corruption.
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|Date of creation:||1999|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Chaire d'economie et d'econometrie de l'assurance; DELTA; CREST; PARIS, France.|
Other versions of this item:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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