Mezzanatto and the Economics of Self Incrimination
This paper uses the economic approach to address a recent legal quesiton involving self incrimination: what is the effect of allowing a defendant to waive his right to exclude statements he makes during plea bargaining from evidence at trial if plea bargaining fails? This was the issue in the 1995 Mazzanatto Supreme Court decision. What is the reason for such waivers, and do they increase or decrease the amount of plea bargaining.
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|Date of creation:||1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Indiana University, Center for Econometric Model Research, Department of Economics; Bloomington, IN 47405.|
Web page: http://www.indiana.edu/~econweb/
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