Large Shareholder Activism in Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: Evidence from India
This paper provides evidence on the role of large shareholders in monitoring company value from a developing country, India, whose corporate governance system is a hybrid of the ousider-dominated-market-based systems of the UK and the US and the insider-dominated-bank-based systems of Germany and Japan. The picture of large-shareholder monitoring that emerges from our case study of Indian corporates is a mixed one.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (022) 840 0919/20/21
Fax: (022) 840 2752/2026
Web page: http://www.igidr.ac.in/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:indgan:153. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.