On the Socially Optimal Patent Policy
The performance of the institutional structure protecting intellectual property is a matter of deep concern in determining economic well-being. Unfortunately, economic theory has been of little help in providing straightforward advice for policy-makers, the range of contradictory results reported in literature being rather impressive. The aim of this article is to develop a very stylised model that encompasses a variety of different findings, and to derive a general rule for the optimal patent policy.
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +358 9 191 8897
Fax: +358 9 191 8877
Web page: http://www.helsinki.fi/politiikkajatalous/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:helsec:458. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.