I Say Hello, and You Say Goodbye. A Model of Informational Differentiation
We analyze a model related to the strategic hereding literature where a second expert maximises his expected second period vvalue by conforming witj a first expert ("herding"). In contrast to the herdinfg literature we assume that an agent is most valuable if he is the only smart agent. We describe an equilibrium in which the second expert always opposes its predecessor's report. We call this anti-herding phenomenom "differenciation". Particular equilibrium charasteristics and also real life examples of differentiation are discussed.
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|Date of creation:||1997|
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