Rent Extraction by an Unregulated essential Facility
This paper shows that a regulator should be careful when regulating a final product which industry is characterized by an unregulated essential facility sold through non-linear tariffs. Two regulatory environments are considered: the Laffont-Tirole framework with exogenous public funds and the Ramsey-Boiteux setting with a unique budget constraint over all the regulated activities. In both cases, the upstream monopoly obtains greater profits when there is regulation than when there is not, i.e. when the upstream monopoly deals directly with the downstream firm. Therefore, if it has this opportunity, the regulator chooses not to regulate the downstream firm in order to linit this rent extraction.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Fax: 05 61 22 55 63
Web page: http://www-gremaq.univ-tlse1.fr/Email:
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:gremaq:00-538. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.