The EU Stability Pact and the Case for European Monetary Union
Along with other prospective EMU members, the Irish government is now commited to the "Stability and Growth Pact", which proposes heavy penalties for countries whose deficit-to-GDP ratios breach certain stipulated conditions. Agreement on the broad outlines on the Pact of Dublin Summit of 13-14 december 1996 was hailed as a triumph of Irish diplomacy. But most academic economists have expressed grave misgivings about the Pact, even those who are pro-EMU. In this paper I want to explain why I believe the majority is right and why the Pact strenghens the argument for postponing Irish entry to EMU until the UK also joins.
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|Date of creation:||1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ireland; University College Dublin, Department of Political Economy, Centre for Economic Research, Belfield, Dublin 4|
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Web page: http://www.ucd.ie/economics/
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