Optimal Promotion and Span of Control
Let an organization, such as a government or a firm, evaluate projects with the aim of maximizing social welfare or profits. Each project is evaluated by an agent, who may err. Some agents, however, are more likely to make a correct evaluation. Agents may revealed as making correct evaluations can be promoted to evaluate projects. The paper considers the optimal allocation of project evaluations to agents under these conditions.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:calirv:99-00-22. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.