Competitive Equilbrium: Walras Meets Darwin
Prime objects of this note are (I) excess demand generated by price-taking economic agents, and (II) an alternative version of tatonnement. We relate laws of demand, axioms of revealed preferences, and other notions of generalized monotonicity to evolutionary stable prices. Focus is on local stability of competitive equilibrium. Specifically, we establish that evolutionary stable prices are asymptotically attractive under so-called replicator dynamics.
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|Date of creation:||2000|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, University of Bergen Fosswinckels Gate 6. N-5007 Bergen, Norway|
Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/
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